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Abstract
We consider the real effects of bank lending shocks and how they permeate the economy 
through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all fi rms in Spain with 
a matched bank-fi rm-loan dataset incorporating information on the universe of corporate 
loans for 2003-2013. Using methods from the matched employer-employee literature for 
handling large data sets, we identify bank-specifi c shocks for each year in our sample. 
Combining the Spanish Input-Output structure and fi rm-specifi c measures of upstream
and downstream exposure, we construct fi rm-specifi c exogenous credit supply shocks and 
estimate their direct and indirect effects on real activity. Credit supply shocks have sizable 
direct and downstream propagation effects on investment and output throughout the 
period but no signifi cant impact on employment during the expansion period. Downstream 
propagation effects are comparable or even larger in magnitude than direct effects. The 
results corroborate the importance of network effects in quantifying the real effects of credit 
shocks and show that real effects vary during booms and busts.
Keywords: bank-lending channel, employment, investment, output, matched employer-
employee, input-output linkages.
JEL classifi cation: E44, G21, L25.
Resumen
Este trabajo investiga los efectos reales de shocks de crédito a escala banco-empresa y 
cómo estos efectos se propagan por toda la economía a través de vínculos proveedor-
cliente. A tal fi n, se combinan datos administrativos de empresas españolas con información 
sobre sus relaciones bancarias para el período 2003-2013. Utilizando métodos de
la literatura matched employer-employee que permiten manipular grandes conjuntos
de datos, identifi camos shocks de oferta de crédito específi cos para cada banco y año en 
nuestra muestra. Los resultados indican que los shocks de oferta de crédito tienen efectos 
directos signifi cativos sobre empleo, producción e inversión de las empresas españolas. 
Además, estos shocks de crédito afectan de forma signifi cativa no solo a la actividad real 
(empleo, producción e inversión) de la propia empresa que sufre el shock, sino también a la 
actividad real de sus clientes. Estos efectos de propagación son incluso de mayor magnitud 
que los efectos directos tradicionalmente considerados en la literatura. Con todo esto, los 
hallazgos de este trabajo corroboran la importancia de la propagación en la cuantifi cación 
de los efectos reales de los shocks de crédito y muestran, además, que dichos efectos 
reales varían a lo largo del ciclo económico, siendo mayores durante recesiones.
Palabras clave: crédito, tablas input-output, empleo, inversión, producción.
Códigos JEL: E44, G21, L25.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the real effects of the bank lending channel and how bank-lending shocks
permeate the economy through upstream and downstream linkages. Credit shocks matter if they
have real effects on the economy. We show that bank credit supply shocks do affect, and indeed
permeate the real economy through input and output relations, and we find their effects to differ
between expansions and recessions.
We first analyze the direct real effects on employment, output, and investment of credit supply
shocks for close to the population of Spanish firms for 2003-2013. We identify bank-specific credit
supply shocks for each year in the sample through differences in credit growth between banks lending
to the same firm (bank lending channel at the firm-loan level; Khwaja and Mian (2008), Jimenez,
Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014), Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming)) and matched employer-
employee technique; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). We regress annual employment and
output growth as well as investment rates on the estimated bank supply shocks at the firm-level,
controlling for demand factors. Our micro data replicates to a nearly complete picture of the Span-
ish economy, while the time period, which includes the expansion (2003-2007), the global financial
crisis (2008-2009), and the post-crisis recession (2010-2013), enables the study of the real effects of
idiosyncratic credit shocks during crisis and non-crises episodes.
Notes. Output/Employment growth refers to the change in real value added/employment by industry over the 2006-
2010 period. Downstreamness refers to the downstream position of each industry in the production chain. In particular,
it is computed as the ratio of aggregate final direct use of industry’s output to aggregate use of industry’s output as
an input. Some examples of high downstream industries are Human Health Services (0.75) and Travel Agency, Tour
Operator, etc.(0.68). Some examples of low downstream industries are Electricity Services (0.38), Warehousing and
Support Services for Transportation (0.39), and Basic Metals (0.44). See discussion in Alfaro, Antra´s, Chor,
and Conconi (Forthcoming).
Figure 1: Downstreamness vs employment and output growth by industry
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A simple look at the cross section of industries in Spain shows that employment and real output
fell the most during the crisis in industries located downstream in the Spanish production network
(see Figure 1). This implies that industries more dependent on suppliers were hit relatively more
by the global financial crisis. Downstream propagation of the global financial shock rationalizes this
negative association. We thus proceed to compare direct and indirect propagation effects of bank-
lending shocks related to input-output relations. We combine the Spanish Input-Output structure
and firm-specific measures of upstream and downstream exposure. Based on di Giovanni, Levchenko,
and Mejean (2017) we measure whether firms that buy inputs from industries in which firms affected
by the shocks operate are indirectly affected (downstream effects). Similarly, we also measure whether
firms that sell goods to industries whose firms were affected by the shocks are indirectly affected
(upstream effects).
We find that both the estimated direct effect and propagation effect on real variables are sizable.
Our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in firms’ credit supply generates increases
of 0.28 pp., 0.10 pp., and 0.79 pp. in the change of employment, output and investment, respectively.
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in our measure of how much firms buy inputs from
industries in which credit supply expands (downstream effects) generates increases of 0.30 pp., 0.35
pp., and 0.69 pp. in the change of employment, output and investment. Bank credit supply shocks,
however, exhibit different direct effects over time, being much stronger during the 2008-2009 credit
collapse. We find no significant effects of credit supply shocks on employment before the financial
crisis while investment displays similar reactions throughout the entire period. Also, for employment,
estimated downstream effects are not significant before the crisis.
An important concern in the literature has been identifying plausible exogenous shocks to dis-
entangle the bank lending-channel (or bank-specific shock) from the firm borrowing-channel (i.e.,
firms’ ability, or lack thereof, to borrow from alternative sources).1 Even after identifying the shocks,
the intricate, real consequences may vary across different type of firms involving direct and indirect
effects via buyer-supplier (input-output) relations. Thus far, little empirical work has analyzed this
channel. Effects, moreover, may different during expansions and contractions. Albeit mixed over-
all, evidence of real effects is more consistently found when analyzing financial crises which differ
from other episodes.2 The exercise is very demanding requiring firm-level data linking credit infor-
1Firms may be able to undo a particular negative bank supply shock by resorting to another bank or other
sources of funds. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) and Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) find that firms are able to
substitute to other forms of credit in the presence of loan supply shocks. Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) stress the
difficulties of substituting loans from one bank with loans from another. Midrigan and Xu (2014) emphasize the role
of self-financing; see Khwaja and Mian (2008), and Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) for further discussion.
2The literature has used the Global Financial Crisis, notable for its speed, severity, and international span, to
identify supply effects. As documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), downturns associated with financial crises
differ from other recessions. We discuss related work in the literature review subsection.
mation to outcome variables (employment, investment, output, etc.). Common methodologies that
involve storing a large number of fixed effect dummies are not well suited to handling large data sets,
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while working with smaller subsamples raises aggregation concerns. To overcome these challenges
we proceed as follows, making several contributions to the literature.
To disentangle the bank-lending from the firm-borrowing channel, we exploit firm-loan-bank
relations and use matched employer-employee techniques that enable us to identify multiple time-
varying firm, and bank, fixed effects (see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). This methodology,
as explained below, overcomes limitations faced by previous work that restricted analysis to smaller
samples of firms or particular bank-specific supply shocks, such as the 2007 liquidity drought in
interbank markets.3 The inclusion of firm fixed effects, possible because firms borrow from different
banks, enables us to account for demand effects. combining matched employer-employee estimation
techniques with the Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming) identification strategy, we estimate more
than 2,000 bank-year credit supply shocks and more than six million firm-year credit demand shocks.
These shocks enable us to analyze the evolution of the bank lending channel beyond financial crises
episodes traditionally used in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
adapts and uses the methodology in this context.
As mentioned, we apply this methodology to a new data set that documents credit relations
for the quasi-census of Spanish firms, nearly two million per year. The data set merges loan-level
data on credit in the domestic banking sector from the Central Credit Register (CIR) of Banco de
Espan˜a with administrative data on firm-level characteristics from the Spanish Commercial Registry
for 2003-2013, yielding approximately eighteen million bank-firm-year observations.
We validate our bank-supply-shocks in several ways. First, we divide the sample into healthy
and weak banks, as in Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming). We find that weak banks
experienced greater supply shocks until 2006 and lesser afterwards. We interpret this evolution as
clear evidence favoring the plausibility of our estimated bank supply shocks. Second, if our identified
bank-specific credit shocks capture meaningful supply factors, a bank that experiences a greater shock
should grant more loans to a given firm. Using loan application information, available in the credit
registry dataset, we show this to be the case. Finally, following Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming),
we compute the R-square and show banks’ predicted credit growth to explain banks’ actual credit
growth.
We find the effects of bank supply shocks to be large and significant at the loan-level: a one
standard deviation increase is associated with a 5.1 pp. increase in credit growth. These estimates
3Given the sparsity of typical matrices involved in estimating high-dimensional fixed effects, the use of efficient
algorithms for matrix inversion and storage is fundamental to the matched employer-employee techniques used here
(see, for example, Cornelissen (2008)).
are very stable throughout the whole period. At the firm level, we analyze the change in credit for a
particular firm considering the supply shocks estimated for all banks with relationships to this firm.
We also find sizable effects at the firm level: a one standard deviation increase in credit supply shocks
generates an increase of 3.2 pp. in firm credit growth. This effect, smaller than that estimated at
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the loan level, indicates that firms, in particular multi-bank firms, are able to partially offset bank
supply shocks. Moreover, the estimated effects are higher during the financial crisis, when it is more
difficult for firms to offset a credit shock by resorting to other banks. We perform several robustness
tests of our findings. To ensure results are not driven by few observations, we restrict our sample
of multi-bank firms to those with at least 5 banks per year. In order to account for bank-firm
idiosyncratic factors, we include lagged exposure between bank i and firm j. We also consider two
different subsamples for shock identification and real effects estimation.
We investigate the aggregate effects of financial shocks by using a general equilibrium model
with buyer-supplier relations under the presence of financial frictions, as in Bigio and La’o (2016),
together with our estimated credit supply shocks. In particular, we aggregate our shocks at the firm
level to the industry level, in a way that makes them comparable over time. We then plug these
shocks into the model and examine how the identified credit shocks permeate the economy. We find
that IO linkages significantly amplify the effects of credit supply shocks. The model predicts, for
instance, that during the financial crisis, -0.60 pp. of annual employment growth between 2009 and
2010 was due to a negative credit supply shock (actual growth was -3.28%), with -0.29 pp. due to
direct effects, and -0.31 pp. to propagation effects. The implied growth in employment between
2011 and 2012, during the recession period, was -2.38 pp. (actual growth was -6.98%), -1.20 pp.
attributable to direct, and -1.18 pp. to propagation, effects.
We also use the model to investigate the relative importance of each sector in accounting for the
aggregate effects. In particular, we focus on the financial crisis period and compute counterfactual
economies in which we only shock one industry at a time. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that
the sector that generates the highest output drop is the real estate sector. Our model predicts that
shocking just the real state sector would generate an aggregate output loss of 0.24%. While being
particularly hit by the credit supply shock at the time of the crisis, real state is also intensively
used by other sectors. In fact, our model predicts that around 50% of the 0.24% loss is explained
by propagation of the shock to other sectors. We also find that shocking other central sectors like
electricity services or wholesale would also generate large output losses.
Our paper contributes to the research that identifies the economic effects of credit supply shocks
by isolating the bank lending channel. Papers in this strand include Khwaja and Mian (2008),
Chodorow-Reich (2014), Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014), Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen
(2015), Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016), and Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming).
In relation to this literature, instead of observed supply shocks (e.g., liquidity in Khwaja and Mian
(2008) or Huber (Forthcoming), securitization in Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014), and
higher capital requirements in Blattner, Farihan, and Rebelo (2017) ), we estimate time-variant
bank credit shocks and study their real effects on employment, output, and investment. Employ-
ment effects, for example, substantially differ during the expansion period and the financial crises.
Methodologically, our paper is closest to Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming). The authors estimate
the direct effect of credit supply on firms’ investment by exploiting a sample of around 150 banks and
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1,600 listed firms in Japan over a 20-year period (1990-2010). By using methods from the matched
employer-employee literature, we are able to estimate year-by-year supply shocks for a broader sam-
ple (more than 200 banks and demand shocks for more than 700,000 firms). Our data covering
the quasi-population of Spanish firms, aggregation bias is less of a concern.4 We further contribute
to this literature by quantifying the propagation of the credit supply shocks through input-output
linkages.
A series of recent papers have investigated the aggregate effects of shocks that propagate through
the economy’s IO network, such as Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). Ace-
moglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016) quantify the propagation effects of different types of supply and
demand shocks, relying on instrumental variables for identification, showing their transmission ef-
fects to the aggregate economy to be of first order importance. A series of papers in the literature
have exploited natural disasters as exogenous shocks, finding IO propagation to account for siz-
able effects, see Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016), Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and
Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2016). In recent work, Dewachter, Tielens, and Hove (2017),
using mostly single bank-firm relations in Belgium, exploiting value added information, analyze the
propagation effects of shocks. Giannetti and Saidi (2017) analyze the extent to which the propagation
of credit market shocks depends on the structure of the banking system and the lenders’ share of the
loans outstanding in an industry. Our paper quantifies the effects of a well identified shock, that is,
firm-level credit supply shocks, and investigates the direct and indirect effects on other firms through
connections in the production network. More concretely, we follow di Giovanni, Levchenko, and
Mejean (2017) in using industry-level IO tables together with firm-level information on expenditure
shares to construct measures of firms’ exposure to downstream and upstream shocks.5 On the other
hand, our paper builds on a recent contribution by Bigio and La’o (2016), who quantify the effects
of financial shocks in a general equilibrium model in which industries are connected through the IO
4Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming) methodology also accounts for general equilibrium constraints such that
micro and macro features of the data are mutually consistent. In particular, aggregation of their estimated bank- and
firm-specific shocks exactly replicates the aggregate evolution of credit (even accounting for new lending relationships).
5Alfaro, Antra´s, Chor, and Conconi (Forthcoming) use input-output relations to establish upstream and down-
stream relations.
network. We use credit registry data to identify financial shocks at the firm level. We then aggregate
these shocks at the industry-level and use the model to quantify the implied aggregate effects over
time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
disentangles the banking-lending channel from the firm-borrowing channel. Section 4 presents the
direct real effects of the bank lending shocks. Section 5 discusses our estimates for downstream
and upstream propagation effects of the credit shocks. Section 6 describes the methodology and
framework to quantify the aggregate effects of the credit shocks. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Data
We use three data sets: loan-level data on credit in the domestic banking sector from the Cen-
tral Credit Register (CIR) of Banco de Espan˜a, administrative data on firm-level characteristics
from the Spanish Commercial Registry, and IO tables provided by the INE (“Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ıstica”).
Credit Registry The Central Credit Register (CIR), maintained by the Bank of Spain in its role
as primary banking supervisory agency, contains detailed monthly information on all outstanding
loans exceeding 6,000 euros granted to non-financial firms by all banks operating in Spain since 1984.
Given the low reporting threshold, virtually all firms with outstanding bank debt appear in the CIR.
The CIR identifies the parties involved in each loan, enabling us to match loan-level data from
CIR with administrative data on firm-level characteristics. While the CIR data are available at
the monthly frequency, firm-level characteristics are only available on a yearly basis. Therefore, we
collapse the monthly loan-level data to the annual frequency in order to merge the two datasets. At
the monthly level, each bank-firm relationship is understood as a loan by aggregating all outstanding
loans from each bank-firm-month pair. Annual bank-firm credit exposure is computed as the average
value of monthly loans between bank i and firm j. We end up with a bank-firm-year database
covering 12 years from 2002 to 2013, 235 banks, 1,555,806 firms, and 18,346,144 bank-firm-year pairs
(our so-called loans). Multibank firms represent nearly 75% of bank-firm-year relationships.
The CIR also contains loan application data. Banks receive borrower information (e.g. total
indebtedness or defaults) from the CIR monthly. Because banks can obtain this information for
any firm that makes a genuine attempt to secure credit, any requested information from a bank
about a given firm can be interpreted as a loan application. Matching the monthly records on loan
applications with the stock of credit, enables us to infer whether a loan materialized. If not, either
the bank denied it or the firm obtained funding elsewhere. We use this information in Section 3.1.1
6We combine two databases independently constructed from the Commercial Registry, Central de Balances In-
tegrada (CBI) from the Banco de Espan˜a and SABI (Spain and Portugal Business Registry). The resulting database,
which includes approximately 1,000,000 firms in each year from 2000 to 2013, is available only to researchers under-
taking projects for the Banco de Espan˜a.
to validate our estimated bank-specific credit shocks.
Quasi-Census Administrative Data For firm-level characteristics, we use administrative data
from the Spanish Commercial Registry, which contains the balance sheets of the universe of Spanish
companies given firms are legally obliged to report.6 Included among other variables, it includes
information on: name, fiscal identifier; sector of activity (4-digit NACE Rev. 2 code); 5-digit zip
code location; annual net operating revenue; material expenditures (cost of all raw materials and
services purchased by the firm for the production process); number of employees, labor expenditures
(total wage bill including social security contributions); and total fixed assets.
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Our final sample includes balance sheet information for 1,801,955 firms, with an average of 993,876
firms per year. The firm-level database covers 85%-95% of firms in the non-financial market economy
for all size categories in terms of both turnover and number of employees. Moreover, the correlation
between micro-aggregated employment (and output) growth and the National Accounts counterparts
is approximately 0.95 over the 2003-2013 period (see Figure 2). Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez, and
Moral-Benito (2018) provide an in-depth analysis of this database.
Input-Output Tables We use the Input-Output tables provided by INE and constructed at the
64-industry-level of disaggregation (see Table A.1 for a list of industries). In order to use the most
detailed IO that is available, and because prior year IO tables rely on an industry classification differ-
ent from that used in our firm-level data, we use the IO table provided for the year 2010 throughout
the paper.7 Some examples of industries that are used intensively by many other industries (central
sectors) are Real Estate Services (44), Wholesale (29), Electricity Services (24), Security and In-
vestigation Services; Services to Buildings and Landscape; Office Administrative, Office Support and
Other Business (53) or Basic Metals (15).
Time Coverage To explore whether the real effects of credit supply shocks might vary depending
on the state of the economy, we divide the sample into three sub-periods: 2003-2007 (expansion),
2008-2009 (financial crisis), and 2010-2013 (recession). This division is based on the FRED recession
indicators. We think of 2003-2007 as a boom-expansion era of easy access to credit, 2008-2009 as
a crisis period driven by the collapse of the banking sector during the Global Financial Crisis, and
7Measured at a higher industry-level of disaggregation, we can show that input-output tables in Spain have
remained quite stable over time.
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2010-2013 as the post crisis period of sluggish recovery but still under recession of the Spanish
economy.8
Figure 3 shows a strong correlation between bank credit and real variables during these periods.
As noted in the introduction, an investigation of the link between credit shocks and real variables,
however, poses several challenges. Crucial steps taken to address these challenges are discussed in
the next sections.
3 The Bank Lending Channel
In this section we analyze the bank lending channel. In subsection 3.1, we estimate bank-specific
credit supply shocks by exploiting the richness of our dataset, in which in each period, we observe
different banks lending to the same firm and different firms borrowing from the same bank. We
also describe various ways in which we validate the estimated shocks in 3.1.1. In subsection 3.2, we
quantify the bank-lending channel at the bank-firm (loan) level. In subsection 3.3, we quantify the
bank-lending channel at the firm level by aggregating all loans across banks within each firm.
8As documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), financial crises tend to be characterized by deep recession and
slow recovery. The evolution of the Spanish economy broadly fits this pattern.












2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1
GDP growth Credit growth
Notes. Credit (on the left-scale) refers to bank credit to non-financial corporations taken from Banco de Espan˜a and
output (on the right scale) refers to nominal GDP taken from the National Statistics Institute (INE). The shaded area
represents the financial crisis (2008-2009) period.
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3.1 Estimating Bank-Specific Credit Supply Shocks
Consider the following decomposition of credit growth between bank i and firm j in year t:
Δ ln cijt = δit + λjt + ijt (1)
where cijt refers to the yearly average of outstanding credit of firm j with bank i in year t. δit and λjt
can be interpreted as supply and demand shocks, respectively, and δit captures bank-specific effects
identified through differences in credit growth between banks lending to the same firm.9
Imagine one firm and two banks in year t − 1. If the firm’s credit grows more between t − 1
and t with the first bank, we assume that bank’s credit supply to be larger than that of the second
bank. This is because demand factors are held constant by the inclusion of firm-specific effects (λjt).
This identification strategy resembles that of the bank lending channel by Khwaja and Mian (2008),
save that instead of considering observed bank supply shocks (e.g., liquidity shocks), we consider
9Since the credit registry data has a monthly frequency, we could estimate equation (1) with quarterly or even
monthly data. Using annual data, allows us to have have more firms per bank and better estimate the bank effects.
However, using quarterly/monthly data, allows to better control for demand shocks because firm effects are allowed
to vary within a year. With this trade-off in mind, we have finally decided to use annual data in order to merge the
estimated effects with the dataset on firm-level characteristics available at a yearly frequency.
unobserved shocks estimated by means of bank-specific effects. Finally, ijt captures other shocks to
the bank-firm relationship assumed to be orthogonal to the bank and firm effects. Note that this
identification scheme implies reliance on multi-bank firms, which represent approximately 75% of the
bank-firm-year relationships in our sample.
A common approach for estimating the model in (1) is to include the bank-year effects as dummy
variables and to sweep out the firm-year effects by the within transformation. This approach is
typically labeled as “FEiLSDVj” because it combines the fixed-effects (FE) and the least-squares
dummy variable (LSDV) methods. Standard techniques to implement this method are not feasible
in our case because the matrix of bank-year dummies is too large to fit into memory.10 We thus
resort to estimation techniques borrowed from the matched employer-employee literature (see Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)).11 Given the sparsity of typical matrices involved in the estimation
of high-dimensional fixed effects, the methods used in this literature consider an efficient storage
of these matrices in compressed form so that the “FEiLSDVj” approach is feasible with standard
computers (see for instance Cornelissen (2008)).
Turning to identification, the bank- and firm-effects are identified only in relative terms within
each group.12 A group is understood to be a set of banks and firms connected such that that the
10Our sample contains 24,490,973 bank-firm-year observations and 2,820 bank-years. Assuming that one cell of the
data matrix consumes 8 bytes, storing the matrix of bank-year dummies would consume 552 GB, making the problem
computationally intractable (note that these figures correspond to the high-precision mode in STATA).
11Consistent with the matched employer-employee methods, banks and firms in our data correspond to firms and
workers in typical matched employer-employee panels. Also, for each firm in our data we have the number of banks
as the time dimension in standard matched employer employee datasets.
12To be more concrete, we fix the omitted category to be BBVA, so that individual bank dummies can be interpreted
relative to BBVA.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1809
group contains all firms that have a credit relationship with any of the banks, and all banks that
provide credit to at least one firm in the group. In contrast, a group of banks and firms is not
connected to a second group if no bank in the first group provides credit to any firm in the second
group, nor any firm in the first group has a credit relationship with a bank, in the second group.
In practice, we identify 11 groups in our data using the algorithm in Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz
(2002). Each group corresponds to a calendar year in our data because all firms and banks are
connected within a year but there are neither banks nor firms connected across years. Therefore,
the estimated shocks depend not only on this bank’s credit supply evolution but also on the credit
supply of the omitted category/bank. In section 6, we present a methodology for interpreting the
evolution of the effects. In Appendix B we also discuss an approach that allows identifying a time
varying indicator of aggregate credit supply. This methodology estimates bank-specific time trends
but does not identify bank-year fixed effects required to isolate time-varying credit supply shocks.
3.1.1 Validating the Bank-specific Credit Supply Shocks
In order to assess the plausibility of the δˆit estimates, we divide our sample into healthy and weak
banks, as in Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming). Figure 4 shows the time evolution of
the average difference in credit supply shocks between healthy and weak banks as identified by the
bank dummies (δˆit). Weak banks had higher supply shocks until 2006 and lower afterwards, which
coincides with the narrative in Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming). We interpret this
evolution as clear evidence in favor of the plausibility of our estimated bank supply shocks.
Notes. This plot is based on year-by-year regressions of the estimated bank-level shocks on a constant and a dummy
that takes value of one if the bank is classified as “weak” in Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming). For each
year, we plot the coefficient on the weak bank dummy, which estimates the average difference in supply shocks by
type of bank (weak or healthy).
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We also validate our estimates as follows. If our identified bank-specific credit shocks capture
supply factors, a bank with a larger dummy (δˆit) should grant more loans to the same firm. Loan
application data enables us to test this hypothesis. We regress a loan granting dummy on the
estimated bank shocks and a set of firm fixed effects to account for demand factors. As mentioned
above, the identification of our bank-year dummies relied on multi-bank firms. However, the firms
used in this validation exercise cannot have any credit exposure to the banks in the regression used
to estimate the bank-year shocks as otherwise they would not be observed in the loan application
data. The bank-firm pairs exploited in this exercise are thus not used in the identification of the
bank dummies in (1). In particular, for each year from 2003 to 2013, we run the following regression:
Loan grantedij = γδˆi + λj + ij (2)
where Loan grantedij is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if firm j has at least one loan granted
by bank i (conditional on having applied for a loan) and zero if no loans originated from loan
applications from firm j to bank i. δˆi refers to our estimated bank supply shock for bank i, and λj
captures firm-specific effects to account for demand. The γ parameter captures the effect of credit
supply shocks on the probability of loan acceptance. A positive and significant estimate can be
interpreted as evidence in favor of that our bank dummies capture credit supply. Intuitively, a firm
applying to two different banks—with no previous credit relationship with the firm—has a higher
probability of securing the loan from the bank with the larger bank dummy if γ is positive. Figure 5
plots the estimated γ coefficient for each year. The effect of the bank-specific shocks is positive and
significant in all years, which we interpret as further evidence of the validity of our identified bank
supply shocks.
Notes. This plot is based on year-by-year regressions of the loan granted dummy on the bank-level dummies and
a set of firm fixed effects. The γ parameter plotted estimates the effect of the bank dummies on the probability of
acceptance of a loan request. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Following Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming), we explore how well our predicted banks’ credit
growth explains the banks’ actual credit growth. Specifically, we compute the R-squared of a regres-
sion of the bank’s actual credit growth (Δ ln cit) on the bank’s credit growth predicted by our model
( ˆΔ ln cit).
13 The R2 for the entire 2003-2013 period is 52%, which indicates that the estimated bank-
13We construct ˆΔ ln cit as a weighted average of the change in credit at the bank-firm (loan) level, where weights
are computed as the amount of credit extended to firm j by bank i as a fraction of total credit granted by bank i





ˆΔ ln cijt where ˆΔ ln cijt = δˆit + λˆjt.
14In any case, they are significantly lower than those in Amiti and Weinstein (Forthcoming), which are equal to
one by construction.
and firm-specific effects explains a significant fraction of the variation in bank lending as illustrated
in Figure 6. Note that Figure 6 refers to the intensive margin without including new lending re-
lationships from both credit growth variables, Δ ln cit and ˆΔ ln cit. Indeed, the R-squared drops to
30% when including the extensive margin in actual credit growth. All in all, the estimated R2s are
relatively large in both cases.14
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Fixed effects estimate of bank loan growth
Notes. This graph plots the relationship between the banks’ actual credit growth (Δ ln cit) (y-axis) and that predicted
by our estimates ( ˆΔ ln cit) (x-axis). ˆΔ ln cit is constructed as a weighted average of the change in credit at the bank-
firm (loan) level, where weights are computed as the amount of credit extended to firm j by bank i as a fraction of





ˆΔ ln cijt where ˆΔ ln cijt = δˆit + λˆjt.
3.2 Loan-Level Effects
We first estimate the magnitude of the so-called bank lending channel at the bank-firm (loan) level.
In particular, quantifying the bank lending channel amounts to estimating the β coefficient in the
following model:
Δ ln cijt = βδˆit + ηjt + vijt (3)
ˆ
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where Δ ln cij refers to the credit growth between bank i and firm j in year t, δˆit represents the
estimated bank-specific supply shock, and ηjt accounts for firm-year demand shocks. The lending
channel corresponds to the parameter β. Crucially, the availability of firms borrowing from different
banks enables us to include in the regression time-varying firm fixed-effects (ηjt) to control for the
demand side (see Khwaja and Mian (2008)). Bank supply shocks δit are proxied by exogenous changes
in deposits in Khwaja and Mian (2008), or access to securitization in Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and
Saurina (2014). In our case, we exploit the bank supply shocks estimated above (see section 3.1),
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. In contrast to previous literature, because we
have estimated bank credit supply shocks for each year, we can also estimate the evolution of the
bank lending channel over time.
Note that equation (3) can only be estimated for the sample of multibank firms given the inclusion
of firm-year fixed effects. However, the availability of time-varying firm fixed effects (λˆjt) estimated
in section 3.1 enables us to estimate the bank lending channel parameter in the sample of all firms
as follows:15
Δ ln cijt = βδˆit + γλˆjt + vijt (4)
Table 1 reports the estimates of the bank lending channel at the bank-firm (loan) level. Column
(1) presents the results of estimating equation (3) using the entire period (2003-2013). We find a
positive and significant effect: conditional on firm fixed effects, higher estimated bank shocks imply
higher growth in credit at the bank-firm level. In terms of magnitude, our estimates imply that a
one standard deviation increase in the credit supply shock of bank i generates a 5.1 pp. increase in
credit growth between bank i and firm j. It is worth mentioning that when re-estimate column (1)
without firm-specific effects on the same sample of multibank firms, the bank lending channel is less
important, the effect dropping from 5.1 pp. to 4.2 pp. This reduction indicates that banks’ supply
and firms’ loan demand shocks are negatively correlated in the cross-section as also found by Khwaja
and Mian (2008).
Column (2) of Table 1 repeats the estimation of column (1) but substituting our firm-year effects
(λˆjt) estimated in section 3.1 for of the firm-year dummies. As expected, the estimates of the bank
lending channel remain very similar as both approaches are equivalent (see Cingano, Manaresi, and
Sette (2016)). In column (3), we repeat the estimation for the sample including all firms and not
only multibank firms, which is possible because of the availability of firm-specific effects (λˆjt) for all
firms in the sample. Finally, columns (4)-(6) show the magnitude of the bank lending channel at the
loan-level to be stable over time.16
15Note that firm-specific shocks are recovered for firms without multiple bank relationships by subtracting the
bank-specific component λˆjt = Δ ln cijt − δˆit.
16Figure C.2 in Appendix C presents the year-by-year estimates of the loan-level effect.
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Table 1: Estimates of the bank lending channel at the loan-level
2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit Shock 5.058∗∗∗ 5.218∗∗∗ 5.272∗∗∗ 5.401∗∗∗ 5.320∗∗∗ 5.181∗∗∗
(s.e.) (0.088) (0.037) (0.025) (0.021) (0.062) (0.063)
# obs 12,216,375 12,216,375 17,954,745 7,624,590 3,682,414 5,124,886
# banks 221 221 221 209 192 192
# firms 700,722 700,722 1,511,767 1,183,558 1,049,208 1,019,567
R2 0.350 0.349 0.522 0.543 0.503 0.484
Fixed effects firm × year λˆjt λˆjt λˆjt λˆjt λˆjt
Sample firms Multibank Multibank All All All All
Notes. This table reports the estimates of the bank lending channel parameter at the loan level (β). Column (1) is
based on equation (3) for a sample of multibank firms. Columns (2) are (3) are based on equation (4), controlling
for the firm-year estimated fixed effects. The dependent variable is credit growth between firm j and bank i. Credit
Shock refers to the bank-specific credit supply shock (δˆit) estimated in equation (1), normalized to have zero mean
and unit variance. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses.
3.3 Firm-Level Effects
The bank lending channel appears to be quantitative and statistically important given the loan-level
estimates reported in section 3.2. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is similar for multibank and
single bank firms. However, firms may be able to undo a negative bank supply shock by resorting to
other banks, especially in the case of multibank firms. If this is the case, a large drop in the credit
of a client firm with a bank affected by a negative supply shock would not capture the actual effect
of credit supply on credit growth. In order to obtain such an estimate, we consider the following
regression at the firm level:
Δ ln cjt = β
F δjt + γ
F λˆjt + ujt (5)
where δj represents a firm-specific credit supply shock constructed as a weighted average of the
supply shocks estimated for all banks in a relationship with firm j with, weights given by the share







Given this specification, the bank lending channel at the firm-level can be estimated from βF , as
in Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014). As in the loan-level
case, however, we can obtain time-varying estimates of the bank lending channel.
We also account for demand shocks at the firm-level. In the case of loan-level data, the inclusion
of firm unobserved heterogeneity is possible due to the circumstance of firms borrowing from different
banks. This approach is no longer possible when using firm-level data. Under these circumstances,
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Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) take recourse to the
correlation between supply and demand effects implied by differences between the OLS and FE
estimates at the loan-level to correct the biased OLS estimate of βF . In particular, they exploit the
fact that differences between the OLS and FE estimates at the loan level in equation (3) provide a
quantification of the covariance between δit and ηjt given the formula for omitted variable bias. In
our case, we include, in the firm level regression, the firm-level demand shocks (λˆjt) estimated in
section 3.1 by means of matched employer-employee techniques. Both approaches are equivalent but
including the estimated demand shocks enables us to easily compute appropriate standard errors.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the bank lending channel at the firm level. The effect is positive
and significant. The magnitude is smaller than that estimated at the loan level, which indicates that
firms are able to partially offset bank supply shocks. Not surprisingly, multibank firms can better
undo bank shocks: a one standard deviation increase in the credit supply of firm j generates an
overall increase of 3.2 pp. in credit growth (see column (2)), whereas the effect is 1.1 pp. in the case
of multibank firms, as reported in column (1). Turning to the evolution of the bank lending channel
at the firm level, columns (3)-(5) illustrate that the effect of bank shocks on firm credit growth
is significantly larger during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In particular, a one standard deviation
increase in credit supply generates a 4.8 pp. increase in credit growth during those years (average
firm credit growth during 2008-2009 was -6.2%), which is significantly larger than the effect during
2003-2007 and 2010-2013.17
Interestingly enough, the magnitude of the bank lending channel at the firm level varies signifi-
cantly over the cycle (see Table 2) while it does not vary at the loan level (Table 1). Since loan level
effects are very similar across the different subperiods, the larger effects at the firm level during the
financial crisis points to a more limited capacity of firms to substitute credit across banks during
this period. This finding may also be at the root of the larger real effects of credit shocks during the
global financial crisis discussed below.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that including firm-year demand shocks in the model has a crucial
effect on the estimates. Re-estimating the model in (5) by OLS without firm-level effects (λˆjt), the
2003-2013 estimate of βF drops from 3.2 pp. to 0.7 pp., indicating that banks’ supply and firms’ loan
demand shocks are negatively correlated in the cross-section, as found in the loan-level case.
17Figure C.2 in Appendix C presents the year-by-year estimates of this effect.
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Table 2: Estimates of the bank lending channel at the firm-level
2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit Shock 1.158∗∗ 3.207∗∗∗ 3.414∗∗∗ 4.846∗∗∗ 2.162∗∗∗
(s.e.) (0.515) (0.278) (0.197) (0.483) (0.564)
# obs 4,424,519 8,743,459 4,122,017 1,920,723 2,700,719
# banks 220 220 208 191 193
#firms 924,441 1,481,377 1,183,558 1,049,208 1,019,567
R2 0.330 0.501 0.525 0.521 0.412
Sample firms Multibank All All All All
Notes. This table reports the estimates of the bank lending channel parameter at the firm level (βF )
estimated from equation (5). The dependent variable is the credit growth of firm j in year t. Credit Shock
refers to the firm-specific credit supply shock (δˆjt) estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero
mean and unit variance. All specifications include a set of firm-year effects (λˆjt). We denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are
reported in parentheses.
4 Direct Real Effects of Credit Shocks
We now turn to analyzing the real effects of the identified credit supply shocks. To estimate the
effects of the bank lending channel on real outcomes, we match the credit registry information with
annual, firm-level administrative data on different firm characteristics. We consider the effects of
credit supply on firms’ annual employment and output growth as well as investment as follows:
Yjt = θδjt + πXjt + νjt (7)
where Yjt refers to employment growth (in terms of log differences of number of employees), output
growth (in terms of log differences of Euros), or investment (capital stock in t minus capital stock
in t − 1 as a share of total capital stock in t) of firm j in year t.18 δjt is the bank supply shocks
at the firm level defined in equation (6), and Xjt represents a vector of firm-specific characteristics
including the firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt) as well as size dummies, lagged loan-to-assets
ratio, and lagged productivity. Finally, we also include a set of sector × year dummies.
18Note that we trim the 1% tails of firm-level growth rates to make the results robust to outliers. Also, results
considering Δ ln(1 + Ej) and (Ej − Ej,−1)/(0.5 × (Ej + Ej,−1)) as dependent variables remain unaltered. These
alternative definitions are considered by Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (Forthcoming) and Chodorow-Reich (2014),
respectively.
4.1 Entire Sample (2003-2013)
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (7) for the 2003-2013 sample. Columns (1) and
(2) report the results using employment changes of firm j in year t as the left hand side variable Yjt.
Columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) use output changes and investment instead. Columns (1), (3), and (5)
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refer to specifications in which we focus only on multi-bank firms, columns (2), (4), and (6) include
all firms.
We find positive and statistically significant effects of credit supply shocks across all specifications.
With the exception of the effect on employment when using multi-bank firms (column (1)), all
estimated coefficients are significant at 1%. Our estimated coefficients are also economically sizable.
Let us focus first on discussing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for employment. Our
estimates from columns (1) and (2) imply that a one standard deviation increase in the firm’s credit
supply shock is associated with increases in firm employment growth of 0.22 pp. and 0.29 pp.,
respectively. These numbers represent approximately 71% and 93% of the average firm-level annual
employment growth rate of 0.31% over the 2003-2013 period.19
With respect to output, the estimated coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) imply that a
one standard deviation increase in firm credit supply shock is associated with an average increase
in firm output growth of around 0.14 pp. and 0.10 pp., respectively, approximately 27% and 20% of
the observed firm-level annual value added growth of 0.5% over the same period.
When looking at investment, the estimated coefficients reported in columns (5) and (6) imply
that a one standard deviation increase in firm credit supply shock is associated to an increase in
firm investment of 1.00 pp. and 0.80 pp., respectively. These numbers represent 13% and 10% of the
average observed investment rate over the 2003-2013 period. Finally, it is worth highlighting that
these effects are quantitatively and statistically significant for small- and medium-size firms while
effects for larger firms are not statistically significant.20
4.2 Expansion, Financial Crisis, and Recession
As mentioned above, an advantage of our methodology is that it enables us to estimate year-by-year
supply shocks. We now investigate how the real direct effects of firms’ credit supply shocks change
with the state of the macroeconomy. To that end, we break down our sample into three periods.
Table 4 reports our estimated results for employment, output, and investment.
19Average firm-level annual growth refers to the simple average of the change of a variable as measured in our final
sample of firms for a particular period. These are the objects that we systematically use to quantify the size of our
estimates throughout sections 4 and 5.
20Appendix F reports the real effects estimated for firms of different size.
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Table 3: Direct real effects of credit shocks — 2003-2013
employment output investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit Shock 0.222∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(s.e.) (0.127) (0.097) (0.029) (0.030) (0.160) (0.069)
# obs 2,436,177 4,064,376 2,339,456 3,873,003 2,390,583 3,938,238
# banks 216 216 216 216 216 216
#firms 560,954 812,067 542,191 779,500 546,913 782,872
R2 0.060 0.050 0.063 0.057 0.032 0.028
Sample firms Multibank All Multibank All Multibank All
Fixed effects sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year
Notes. This table reports the effect of credit supply shocks on employment (columns (1) and (2)), output (columns
(3) and (4)), and investment (columns (5) and (6)) estimated using equation (7) for the 2003-2013 period. The
dependent variables are employment growth in %, output growth in %, and investment as a share of capital stock.
Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific credit supply shock estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero mean
and unit variance. All regressions include the following control variables: firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt),
size dummies, lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses.
Employment We find aggregate economic conditions to contribute to the understanding of the
effects of credit supply shocks on employment. For example, the estimated effect is not significant
in the regression run for the expansion period of 2003-2007, but is positive and significant in the
regressions run for the financial crisis of 2008-2009.21 In particular, our estimates suggest that
an increase of one standard deviation in the credit supply shock is associated with an increase
in the employment growth rate of 0.5 pp. (column (2)). The average annual change in firm-level
employment for the 2008-2009 period was -2.17%, which implies that the estimated effect represents
18% of the mean change in absolute value. We also find a significant effect in the regressions run
for the recession period (2010-2013) reported in column (7). The estimated effect implies that an
increase of one standard deviation in the credit supply shock is associated with an increase in firm’s
employment growth of approximately 0.24 pp. which represents around 10% of the actual change
over the period in absolute value (-2.24%).
Output The effects of credit supply shocks on output are always significant. However, the effect
is particularly strong during the financial crisis of 2008-2009: an increase of one standard deviation
in the shock implies an increase in output growth of 0.15 pp. (column (5)), approximately 9% of the
absolute value of the actual change in output over the period (-1.75%). The estimated effects for
the expansion period (2003-2007) are significantly smaller (0.06 pp.) representing close to 3% of the
21The estimated effect is also not significant when restricting the analysis to multi-bank firms (coefficient of 0.201,
s.e. 0.179) during this period.
actual annual growth over the period (2.12%).
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Table 4: Direct real effects of credit shocks by period
Employment Output Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2003-07 2008-09 2010-13 2003-07 2008-09 2010-13 2003-07 2008-09 2010-13
Credit Shock 0.251 0.503*** 0.243** 0.060** 0.152*** 0.109*** 0.821*** 0.625*** 0.711***
(s.e.) (0.153) (0.149) (0.111) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.173) (0.087) (0.080)
# obs 1,823,859 810,335 1,430,182 1,765,665 764,699 1,342,639 1,763,184 783,316 1,391,738
R2 0.042 0.055 0.035 0.040 0.075 0.042 0.034 0.016 0.011
Notes. This table reports the effect of credit supply on employment, output and investment for the 2003-2007 period
(columns (1), (4), (7)), 2008-2009 (columns (2), (5), (8)), and 2010-2013 (columns (3), (6), (9)) estimated from
equation (7). Dependent variable is employment growth in % in columns (1)-(3); output growth in columns (4)-(6);
and investment in columns (7)-(9). Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific credit supply shock estimated in equation
(6), normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. All regressions include a set of industry × year fixed effects as
well as the following control variables: firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt), size dummies, lagged loan-to-assets
ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard
errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses.
Investment Turning to investment, we find that the estimated coefficients are significant at 1%
across all specifications. In terms of magnitude, we find that a one standard deviation increase in
credit supply shock generates an increase in investment rates that varies from 0.6 pp. to 0.8 pp. The
magnitude of the effect varies across the different periods. For the expansion period (2003-2007),
the estimated effect represents approximately 6% of the actual average investment rate of 12.89%
over the period. The estimated effect represents around 12% of the average investment rate of 5.11%
during the financial crisis. During recession period (2010-2013), the effect more than doubled the
average investment rate of 0.59% observed in the data over the same period.
5 Indirect Real Effects of Credit Shocks
Firms not directly hit by a credit supply shock may be affected through buyer-supplier relations.
For instance, if a supplier of firm j is hit by a negative credit supply shock, the reaction of this
supplier may also affect production of firm j. Indeed, the negative association between employment
growth and downstreamness depicted in Figure 1 resembles this pattern. Employment losses dur-
ing the global financial crisis were larger in those industries more dependent on suppliers (higher
downstreamness). This type of indirect effects of credit supply shocks can operate through different
channels, from purchases/sales of intermediate inputs by the directly hit firms to changes in fac-
tor and goods prices in general equilibrium (see Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2012)).
We exploit our firm level information combined with input-output linkages relations to study the
propagation effects of our identified bank-credit supply shocks. Specifically, following di Giovanni,
Levchenko, and Mejean (2017), we combine firm-specific measures of usage intensity of material
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inputs and domestic sales with the sector-level Input-Output matrix, as in Alfaro, Antra´s, Chor
and Conconi (2017).22 We use IO relations for Spain for both propagation downstream (i.e., shocks
from suppliers) and upstream (i.e., shocks from customers). In practice, we include two additional
regressors in our empirical specification in (7) to capture the indirect effects of credit shocks through
input-output relations.
We have shown in the previous section that credit supply shocks have direct real effects. This
implies that, if a negative credit supply shock hits firms operating in a given industry, the production
in this industry will decrease. Viewed through the lens of standard general equilibrium models with
IO linkages, the fall in production will be associated with an increase in the price of the directly
affected industry. Customer firms, will then be forced to decrease production. DOWNjt,s, a proxy
for this effect, measures the indirect shock received by firm j operating in sector s from its suppliers
(downstream propagation).
In addition, when a negative credit supply shock hits firms operating in a given industry, their
revenue and, hence, their demand for intermediate goods, is likely to go down. This will affect their
supplier industries, which will be forced to scale down production. UPjt,s proxies for this indirect
shock received by firm j operating in sector s from its customers (upstream propagation).













where s and p index sectors, and firm j belongs to sector s. Δjt,p is the credit supply shock hitting
sector p computed as a weighted average of firm-specific shocks (δjt) using credit exposure as weights.
(This shock is firm-specific because firm j is excluded from the computation of sector-specific shocks
in the case that s = p). IOps is the domestic direct requirement coefficient of the 2010 Spanish
Input-Output matrix, defined as the share of spending on domestically-produced sector p inputs for
production in sector s. Finally, ωINjt refers to total input usage intensity of firm j in year t, defined
22di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2017) construct proxies for indirect linkages between French firms and
foreign countries inspired by the propagation terms in Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2016). Alfaro, Antra´s, Chor, and
Conconi (forthcoming) use input-output linkages to establish upstream and downstream relations.
as the total material input spending divided by material input spending plus wage bill and ωDOjt
domestic sales intensity, defined as the domestic market share of firm j’s sales, that is total sales
minus exports divided by total sales.
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Armed with these indirect credit supply shocks, we estimate the following model:
Yjt = θδjt + θDDOWNjt,s + θUUPjt,s + πXjt + νjt (10)
where all elements are defined as in equations (7), (8), and (9).
5.1 Propagation Results
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show the results of running regressions from specification (10) using change in
employment, change in output, and investment as the left hand side variables Yjt. We find strong
evidence to the propagation of real effects of firms’ credit supply shocks. In fact, we find, depending
on the specifications, that the coefficients associated with our measure of downstream propagation,
DOWNjt,s, are similar or larger in magnitude than the estimated coefficients for direct effects. The
effects are particularly strong for the financial crisis 2008-2009 period. We find mixed evidence
for the case of upstream propagation, UPjt,s, our estimated coefficients having different signs and
significance depending on the left hand side variable use and period.23
Employment Running the specification for the entire sample period yields estimated coefficients
for the direct credit shock and indirect downstream propagation shock (DOWN ) that are similar in
magnitude. In particular, these estimates imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the
DOWN variable is associated with an increase of approximately 0.30 pp. in the change in employment,
which compares with the estimated 0.28 pp. for the direct effect (see column (1) of Table 5). These
numbers represent approximately 96% and 91% of the actual average annual change in firm-level
employment over the same period (0.31%). We find an insignificant effect for the indirect upstream
propagation shock (UP). When focusing on the expansion period (2003-2007), the effects of credit
shocks are not significant (see column 2 of Table 5). Note that the insignificant effect on employment
of the direct shock was present before when not including the indirect shocks (column (1) of Table
4). In fact, the estimated coefficients for the direct shock are similar across the two specifications
(0.222 vs 0.284).
For the financial crisis 2008-2009 period, we find the effect of the indirect downstream propagation
shock (DOWN ) to be particularly strong relative to the direct shock (see column 3 in table 5). The
23Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016) show theoretically that negative upstream propagation effects
are possible under low substitution elasticities between labor and intermediate inputs.
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Table 5: Indirect effects — employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
Credit Shock 0.284*** 0.218 0.482*** 0.255**
(s.e.) (0.098) (0.151) (0.156) (0.111)
DOWN 0.301** -0.077 0.697*** 0.129
(s.e.) (0.119) (0.076) (0.258) (0.392)
UP 0.061 0.062 -0.187 -0.233*
(s.e.) (0.120) (0.078) (0.291) (0.123)
# obs 3827042 1727803 759170 1340069
R2 0.053 0.040 0.059 0.036
Fixed effects sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year
Notes. This table reports the effects of credit supply shocks on employment over the 2003-2013 period and 2003-
07, 2008-09, and 2010-13 sub-periods estimated from equation (10). Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific credit
supply shock estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. DOWN and UP have been
constructed according to equations (8) and (9) respectively. All regressions include the following control variables:
firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt), lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported
in parentheses.
estimates imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the DOWN variable is associated
with an increase of approximately of 0.69 pp in the change in employment, which represents close
to 27% of the absolute value of the average annual change in employment over the period (-2.76%).
The magnitude of the estimated effect for the direct shock is significantly smaller at 0.48 pp, which
represents approximately 17% of the absolute value of the average annual change. The effect of the
indirect upstream propagation shock remains insignificant. Running the regressions for the recession
period, the effect for the DOWN variable is insignficant. Additionally, we find a negative and
significant effect of the upstream propagation shock (UP) of -0.23 pp.
Output The coefficients for output associated with the two indirect propagation shocks are sig-
nificant at 1% when the regression is run for both the entire period (2003-2013) and when we focus
on the financial crisis period (2008-09). In these two specifications, in fact, both indirect effects
dominates the direct effect in terms of magnitude. The downstream (upstream) effect for the whole
period is 0.35 (0.21) is significantly larger than the direct effect of 0.10 pp. Turning to the financial
crisis 2008-09 period, we find that the effects of the downstream and upstream propagation shocks
were 0.64 pp. and 0.46 pp. respectively. These two values represent around 36% and 26% of the
observed average annual growth rate of -1.75% over the period, in comparison to an estimated effect
of the direct shock of 0.15 pp., which represents approximately 9% of the actual change.
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Table 6: Indirect effects — output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
Credit Shock 0.107*** 0.069** 0.155*** 0.108***
(s.e.) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.020)
DOWN 0.354*** 0.204* 0.646*** 0.184
(s.e.) (0.069) (0.106) (0.166) (0.251)
UP 0.209*** 0.086 0.459*** -0.014
(s.e.) (0.077) (0.086) (0.141) (0.125)
# obs 3744353 1704934 739238 1300181
R2 0.067 0.051 0.086 0.049
Fixed effects sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year
Notes. This table reports the effects of credit supply shocks on output over the 2003-2013 period,and the 2003-2007,
2008-2009, and 2010-2013 sub-periods estimated using equation (10). Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific credit
supply shock estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. DOWN and UP have been
constructed according to equations (8) and (9) respectively. All regressions include the following control variables:
firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt), lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported
in parentheses.
Investment The estimates of the direct shock to investment are significant at 1% across all specifi-
cations. The indirect downstream shock is significant when focusing on the entire period and during
the financial crisis. The indirect upstream shock is only significant in the expansion (2003-2007)
specification. As in the employment case, the direct and indirect downstream effects are relatively
similar in magnitude when looking at the whole period (2003-2013), 0.79 pp. and 0.69 pp. respec-
tively. These effects represent around 10% and 9% of the actual average investment rate over the
period. When focusing on the financial crisis, the indirect downstream effect is stronger than the
direct effect. The estimated effect for the former is 1.26 pp. which compares to the 0.57 pp. for the
latter. These numbers represent approximately 24% and 11% of the observed average investment
rate.
Summary Table 8 summarizes our main findings while Appendix D reports the year-by-year es-
timates. Over the entire sample period 2003-2013, indirect credit shocks through IO propagation
have a significant effect on the evolution of firm-level employment, output and investment. This
effect is driven by the financial crisis period (2008-2009), where the downstream propagation effect
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Table 7: Indirect effects — investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003-2013 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
Credit Shock 0.798*** 0.845*** 0.576*** 0.708***
(s.e.) (0.075) (0.177) (0.101) (0.085)
DOWN 0.690*** 0.266 1.263*** 0.110
(s.e.) (0.174) (0.281) (0.320) (0.552)
UP 0.174 0.403** 0.085 -0.402
(s.e.) (0.209) (0.172) (0.352) (0.401)
# obs 3737540 1687930 739729 1309881
R2 0.030 0.036 0.018 0.012
Fixed effects sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year
Notes. This table reports the effects of credit supply shocks on investment over the 2003-2013 period and the 2003-
2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2013 sub-periods estimated from equation (10). Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific
credit supply shock estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. DOWN and UP
have been constructed according to equations (8) and (9) respectively. All regressions include the following control
variables: firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt), lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level
are reported in parentheses.
Table 8: Summary and magnitude of the estimated effects
Employment Output Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009
mean annual growth (%) 0.312 -2.764 0.508 -1.755 7.572 5.111
Credit Shock coefficient (θ) 0.284*** 0.482*** 0.107*** 0.155** 0.798*** 0.576***
|θ/mean annual growth (%)| 0.91 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.11
DOWN coefficient (θD) 0.301*** 0.697*** 0.354*** 0.646** 0.690*** 1.263***
|θD/mean annual growth (%)| 0.96 0.28 0.70 0.37 0.09 0.25
UP coefficient (θU) 0.061 -0.187 0.209*** 0.459*** 0.174 0.085
|θU/mean annual growth (%)| 0.19 0.60 0.41 0.26 0.02 0.02
Notes. This table presents a summary of the estimated effects reported in tables 6, 7 and 5. We focus on the effects
estimated for the entire period (2003-2013) and the financial crisis (2008-2009) period. Mean annual growth (%)
refers to the simple average annual growth rate of the variable as measured in our final sample of firms for a particular
period. Credit Shock coefficient (θ), DOWN coefficient (θD), and UP coefficient (θU ) are the estimated coefficients
reported in Tables 6, 7, and 5. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. |θ/mean
annual growth (%)| is simply the absolute value of the estimated coefficient divided by the mean annual growth (%).
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systematically dominates in magnitude the direct effect of credit shocks. Note also that the difference
in the coefficients estimated for employment and value added for the boom period (2003-2007) and
the financial crisis (2008-2009) are statistically significant with with p-values below 0.1, both for the
direct and the downstream indirect effects. For the case of investment, coefficients are different only
for the downstream indirect effect. However, the differences in the estimates for the financial crisis
(2008-2009) and the recession (2010-2013) are not statistically significant. Finally, evidence of the
importance of the upstream propagation shock is mixed, in terms of both the significance and size
of the effect.
5.2 Robustness Checks
Appendix E reports a battery of exercises that confirm our main findings to be robust along several
dimensions. We first split our sample in two subsamples, one for bank shock estimation, the other
for the regressions.24 Firms used in the identification of the bank credit shocks are thus not included
in the subsequent regressions on real outcomes. The aim of this exercise is to ensure exogeneity
of the bank shocks with respect to firms’ decisions as relationship lending is fully absent in these
results. Table E.2 in Appendix E shows our baseline results to remain unaltered when considering
these exercises thereby corroborating the exogeneity of our baseline bank credit shocks.
Second, we restrict our sample of multibank firms for bank shock identification to those with at
least 5 banks per year, to ensure that results are not driven by a handful of firms whose fixed-effects
estimates can be noisy consequent to being identified by too few observations. Table E.3 illustrates
the main conclusions to be robust to this exercise.
Third, we include in equation (1) the lagged exposure between bank i and firm j in order to
account for bank-firm idiosyncratic factors. As expected from the the findings in Amiti and Weinstein
(Forthcoming), the results are not affected by inclusion of these bank-firm-specific factors (see Table
E.4).
Finally, Appendix F reports the real effects estimated for firms of different size. Overall the main
patterns are quantitatively and statistically significant for small- and medium-size firms while effects
for larger firms are not statistically significant.25
24To be more concrete, we randomly divide firms’ fiscal IDs into two subsamples of equal size.
25Note also that industries that rely on larger number of suppliers are not industries characterized by greater
number of larger firms.
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6 FromMicro to Macro: Aggregate Effects of Credit Shocks
In previous sections we estimated the relationship between credit supply shocks and real variables
to be statistically significant and economically sizable. In this section, we quantify the aggregate
effects of bank credit supply shocks on output and employment. For that purpose, we use a general
equilibrium model with financial frictions and input-output linkages to quantify the propagation
effects of the credit supply shocks identified from the data.
Our quantitative strategy is as follows: we first estimate employment effects of credit shocks
that are comparable over time. To this end, we consider an IV strategy that serves to identify
the elasticity between credit and employment at the firm level; then, we aggregate to the industry
level the employment effects of credit shocks estimated at the firm level. We use these direct effects
estimated from the data to calibrate our model.
Armed with calibrated parameters, we first quantify the aggregate effects of the implied financial
shocks, and use the model to measure the relative importance of the direct vs propagation effect.
We then use the model to quantify the role of individual sectors in generating the aggregate effects.
We next describe the model, the calibration strategy, and the identified aggregate effects.
6.1 A Quantitative Model
We use a general equilibrium model that enables us to quantify the aggregate industry- and macro-
level effects of the credit supply shocks estimated above and compare the evolution of the effects
over time. To this end, we employ a framework in which supply shocks to a given industry directly
affect its output and indirectly affect the output of related industries. We quantify the propagation
effects predicted by the model by plugging in our estimated shocks aggregated at the industry level.
In particular, we build on the model recently developed by Bigio and La’o (2016). We explain the
main features of the model in the text in what follows while present a more detailed description in
Appendix G.
Productive Structure: There are n industries, and a representative firm operating in each in-
dustry i competing in monopolistic competition.26 Firms have access to a decreasing returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function in which labor and intermediate goods are used as inputs.
How intensively firms in a given industry use goods produced in their own and other industries is
determined by the input-output structure of the economy.
Financial Frictions: Each firm must borrow the total cost of inputs expenditures (wages plus
intermediate good costs) before initiating production. How much a firm can borrow is limited to
a fraction of its revenue, which is sector specific. Under some circumstances, firms would like to
26The concepts of firm and industry are thus interchangeable in the model.
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borrow in excess of the limit and hence will be financially constrained.27 In this case, firm’s marginal
revenue will be higher than the firm’s marginal cost.
Households: A representative household maximizes a utility over consumption of a composite
good and the amount labor supplied in the market. The composite consumption good is the result of
aggregating across the n goods in the economy. To simplify the analysis, we assume a Cobb-Douglas
aggregator. The household solves the problem of choosing how much to consume of each good and
how much to work subject to its budget constraint.
6.2 Calibration and Predicted Real Effects
To quantify the aggregate propagation effects, we consider a two-step strategy. First, we calibrate
the model to the Spanish economy for the year 2003 following Bigio and La’o (2016). Second, we
discipline the changes in the financial friction parameters using our estimated real effects of credit
shocks at the industry level.
With respect to the calibration for 2003, we proceed as follows: (i) we take the parameter
governing decreasing returns to scale in every industry and the parameters governing the household
labor supply from outside the model; (ii) then we calibrate the remaining parameters to match
important statistics of the Spanish economy (see Appendix (G) for details).
The parameters governing the IO structure of the economy are from the Spanish IO direct re-
quirement matrix. Information provided in this matrix enables us to measure, in each industry, the
expenditure on each intermediate good as a fraction of total expenditure on intermediate goods.
For the “initial” level of financial frictions, that is, financial frictions in 2003, we target the ratio of
industries’ expenditures to revenue. In the model, this is given by the degree of financial frictions
and the parameter governing decreasing returns to scale. Given our predetermined value for the
decreasing returns to scale parameter, we can easily recover a parameter that governs the degree
of financial frictions for each industry. Labor share in each industry is pinned down by matching
the industries’ expenditures in labor as a fraction of total expenses on inputs. Finally, we identify
the different industries’ shares in the household’s utility function by matching the final consumption
expenditure shares measured in the data for each industry.
Turning to the second step, we use our reduced form estimates of the direct real effects of credit
supply shocks to discipline the changes in financial frictions that we plug into the model. We find
values for the parameter governing the financial frictions (i.e. the parameter influencing the collateral
constraint) in each industry that yield a horizontal economy version of the model able to generate
27In particular, firms will be financially constrained whenever the fraction they can borrow is less than the parameter
that governs the decreasing returns to scale. See Appendix G for details.
the changes in employment implied by our reduced form estimates of the direct real effects described
below.
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To be more concrete, we identify the changes in financial frictions (i.e. credit supply shocks)
for the year 2004 by employing an horizontal economy version of the model to generate changes
in employment between 2003 and 2004 that correspond to those estimated from our predicted real
effects as described below. With new values for the parameters governing financial frictions in 2004,
we can proceed in similar manner for the years 2005-2013. Conceptually, we are identifying financial
shocks by matching (with a version of the model in which propagation effects are absent) the direct
effect on employment estimated from the data as we next describe.
Predicted Real Effects To estimate the employment effects of credit shocks that are comparable
over time and used in the calibration, we compute the effects in employment at the firm-level that
are predicted by the direct credit supply shocks and aggregate them to the industry-level. Armed
with these direct effects estimated from the data, we quantify the real effects of the financial shocks
over time according to the calibration strategy described.
We first estimate the strength of the credit channel at the firm level by regressing employment
firm growth on credit growth instrumented with our firm-specific credit supply shocks:
Δ lnEj = φΔ ln cj + πIVXj + uj (11)
Δ ln cj = ψδj + ΦIVXj + vj
where Δ ln cj refers to the credit growth of firm j, δj is the bank supply shocks at the firm level
defined in equation (6), and Xj are firm level controls. The identification assumption is that bank
credit supply (δj) affects firm growth only through its effect on credit. Note that the first stage is
similar to the bank lending channel at the firm level estimated in (5). Moreover, the reduced form
effect in (7) is equal to the bank lending channel multiplied by the pass-through of credit to firm
growth: θ = ψ × φ. We then estimate year-by-year counterfactual employment growth at the firm
level in the absence of credit supply shocks using the estimates from (11). More specifically, we first
estimate the firm-level credit growth due to the bank supply shocks:
˜Δ ln cj = ψˆδj (12)
With the credit growth induced by supply factors (˜Δ ln cj), we can estimate the counterfactual
employment growth that would have been observed in the absence of credit supply shocks as follows:
˜Δ lnEj = Δ lnEj − φˆ˜Δ ln cj (13)
where Ej refers to employment of firm j, and φˆ refers to the estimate obtained from (11).
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We apply this formula at the industry level to obtain sector-specific credit supply shocks in terms
of employment. The estimated effects point to positive credit supply shocks over the 2003-2007 period
for all the 64 (NACE rev2 classification) sectors. In contrast, the shocks appear to be negative in
the 2008-2009 period.
6.3 Aggregate Effects Across Periods
We first analyze quantitative importance of the propagation effects by “shocking” all the industries
of the economy at once. We use the “estimated” financial frictions parameters for each year to
solve the full economy with IO linkages and thereby quantify the propagation effects of credit supply
shocks. Table 9 presents the aggregate effects of our estimated financial shocks on employment and
real output in the Spanish economy. The table presents, for each year from 2004-2013, three series
for employment and real output: (i) the direct effect of our estimated shocks as predicted by the
horizontal economy model, i.e., the model without input-output linkages; (ii) the direct+network
effect as predicted by the full model, and (iii) actual growth as measured in the data.
The full model accounts for significant fractions of the observed increases in output and em-
ployment over the boom period (2003-2007). For instance, the change in employment between 2005
and 2006 predicted by the full model is 0.85%, which represents approximately 20% of the observed
4.16% change in the data.28 In terms of output, for the same year, the change predicted by the
model is 2.02%, which is around 62% of the 3.23% observed in the data. For the financial crisis
(2008-2009), the model tends to under-estimate the observed employment decline and over-estimate
that in output. For example, the model (data) predicts a decline in employment of 1.34% (8.57%)
between 2008 and 2009. In the case of output, the model (data) predicts a fall of -3.18% (-0.39%).
For the recession period (2010-2013), the model predicts negative changes in output, the changes
28“Observed changed in the data” refers to the change in aggregate employment and real value added as measured
in Spanish National accounts. Notice that these changes are different from those used for the quantification of the
reduced form estimates, which refer to simple average growth rates across the firms present in our sample.
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Table 9: Aggregate effects of credit supply shocks on employment and output
Direct Effect Network Effect Total Effect Actual growth
Year (model) (model) (model) (data)
Panel A: Employment growth
2003-2004 0.47 0.49 0.96 3.31
2004-2005 0.37 0.37 0.74 4.20
2005-2006 0.41 0.44 0.85 4.16
2006-2007 0.20 0.22 0.42 3.93
2007-2008 -0.15 -0.17 -0.32 -0.49
2008-2009 -0.64 -0.70 -1.34 -8.57
2009-2010 -0.29 -0.31 -0.60 -3.28
2010-2011 -0.44 -0.44 -0.88 -3.78
2011-2012 -1.20 1.18 -2.38 -6.98
2012-2013 -0.39 0.34 -0.73 -4.97
Panel B: Real output growth
2003-2004 0.48 1.87 2.35 3.12
2004-2005 0.41 1.43 1.84 3.46
2005-2006 0.42 1.60 2.02 3.23
2006-2007 0.20 0.78 0.98 3.22
2007-2008 -0.15 -0.60 -0.75 3.26
2008-2009 -0.64 -2.54 -3.18 -0.39
2009-2010 -0.29 -1.15 -1.44 -0.66
2010-2011 -0.44 -1.72 -2.16 0.70
2011-2012 -1.21 -4.81 -6.03 0.21
2012-2013 -0.40 -1.49 -1.89 0.13
Notes. Table shows the growth of employment and output predicted by the model between years.
The first column (Direct Effect) reports the predicted change by the horizontal economy version of
the model in which IO linkages are absent. The second column (Network) effect reports the change
predicted by the full model minus the change predicted by the horizontal economy model. The
third column reports the change predicted by the full model. The fourth column presents the actual
change as measured in the Spanish National accounts (source: National Statistical Institute).
being positive in the data. The reason for this is that we are identifying changes in financial frictions
by matching the observed changes in employment, which are negative. Given negative changes in
employment, the model generates negative changes in output. as mentioned, Appendix B presents a
time varying indicator of credit supply that is consistent with the evolution over time resulting from
the model.
We now quantify the aggregate effects of shocking one industry at a time. This exercise allows
us to analyze the relative importance of different sectors in accounting for the aggregate effects. We
focus on the financial crisis (2008-2009), which is the period in which the estimated credit supply
shocks are largest. Our starting point is the calibrated economy for 2008. We compute a number
of counterfactual economies in which we shock each of the 62 different industries at a time. We
then compare the implied level of output of these economies with that of the 2008 economy. We
decompose this effect into the direct and the propagation effect. The right panel of Figure 7 shows
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the results of this exercise. Each dot represents a different counterfactual economy in which we only
shock the labeled industry. The left panel shows shows the IO direct requirement matrix of the
Spanish economy.
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Notes. The left panel shows the IO structure of the Spanish economy for the year 2010 (direct requirement matrix).
Element {i, j} represents the amount of euros spent by industry i in goods from industry j as a fraction of gross
output in industry i. A contour plot method is used, showing only those shares greater than 1%, 2%, 5%, 10% and
20%. Source: INE. The right panel shows the output loss due to the direct (x-axis) and propagation effect (y-axis)
between 2008 and 2009 of applying our industry-specific shocks one by one.
We find that the shock that generates the largest output loss is the one that affects the Real
Estate (44) sector. The implied output loss is around 0.24%, of which 0.11% is explained by the
direct effect and 0.13% by the propagation effect. There are several reasons why the counterfactual
economy in which we shock only this sector is the one that produces the largest output loss. First,
this sector accounted for a high share of the Spanish economy in 2008 (around 13%). Second, our
estimated credit supply shock in that year was the highest among all industries. And third, this
sector is one of the most connected to others through the IO network. In particular, it is a sector
whose output is produced intensively by many other sectors.
Perhaps more interestingly, we find that shocking central sectors in the IO structure of the
economy implies large output losses even if the shocks are not particularly high. Take for instance
the sectors for which the negative direct effect on output is between 0 and 0.5. Across these sectors,
however, there is significant variation in the estimated propagation effects, which translates into large
differences of the implied total output loss. Some examples of sectors for which the propagation
effect is much larger than the direct effect are Electricity,etc (24), Construction (27) and Wholesale
(29). Shocking each of these sectors at a time would imply aggregate output losses of 0.22%, 0.19%
and 0.17% respectively. Out of these total effects, 0.20, 0.18, and 0.14 are accounted for by the
propagation effect. These results show the importance of IO linkages in explaining the aggregate
effects of a credit supply shock to a given industry.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the direct and indirect real effects of the bank lending channel. Using the
quasi-census of firms’ loans and economic activity for Spain and input-output linkages, we analyze
the real effects of bank-lending shocks during the period of 2003-2013. This period allows us to study
firms’ responses to different shocks during times of boom (expansion) and bust (financial crisis and
recession).
We bring to this analysis new methods from the matched employer-employee literature, which
accommodate handling large data sets, combined with a methodology that enables analyzing the
evolution of credit shocks over time. Specifically, we construct firm-specific, exogenous credit sup-
ply shocks and estimate their direct effects on firm credit, employment, output, and investment
over a decade. We find sizable effects of credit supply shocks on real outcomes, particularly dur-
ing the Global Financial Crisis. Effects during the expansion differ. For example, direct effects
on employment are not significant while investment reacts to credit supply shocks over the entire
period. Combining the Spanish Input-Output structure and firm-specific measures of upstream and
downstream exposure, we find the estimated bank credit supply shocks to have strong downstream
propagation effects, larger in magnitude than the direct effects.
Our results show that credit supply shocks affect the real economy through sizable direct and
indirect effects that affect investment and output primarily. Loan-, firm-, direct, and indirect effects
are quantitatively important during the financial crisis but the impact cannot be generalized to other
episodes. Overall, our results corroborate the importance of network effects in quantifying the real
effects of credit shocks. More generally, our estimates show that the real effects of bank-lending
shocks vary substantially during booms and busts.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: List of industries
Number Industry
1 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
2 Forestry and logging
3 Fishing and aquaculture
4 Mining and quarrying
5 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products
6 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products
7 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture
8 Manufacture of paper and paper products
9 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
10 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
11 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
12 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
13 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
14 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
15 Manufacture of basic metals
16 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
17 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
18 Manufacture of electrical equipment
19 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
20 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
21 Manufacture of other transport equipment
22 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing
23 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
24 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
25 Water collection, treatment and supply
26 Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery;
27 Construction
28 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
29 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
30 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
31 Land transport and transport via pipelines
32 Water transport
33 Air transport
34 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
35 Postal and courier activities
36 Accommodation; food and beverage service activities
37 Publishing activities
38 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities
39 Telecommunications
40 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities
41 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
42 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
43 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
44 Real estate activities
45 Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
46 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
47 Scientific research and development
48 Advertising and market research
49 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities
50 Rental and leasing activities
51 Employment activities
52 Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities
53 Security and investigation activities; services to buildings and landscape activities; business support activities
54 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
55 Education
56 Human health activities
57 Social work activities
58 Creative, arts and entertainment activities; libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities; gambling activities
59 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
60 Activities of membership organisations
61 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
62 Other personal service activities
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B A Time-varying Credit Supply Indicator
The aggregate estimates reported in section 3 clearly suggest a positive credit supply shock during
the boom period (2004-2007) and negative afterwards. In this appendix, we present an alterna-
tive approach and estimate a time-varying indicator of credit supply that confirms this pattern.
Intuitively, we use the loan-level data to estimate bank-specific time trends of credit supply after
accounting for demand shocks (i.e., firm fixed effects). The resulting bank-specific time trends can
then be aggregated to construct an aggregate indicator of credit supply over time.
Consider the following model:
Δ ln cijt = μjt + ζi +K
′
i × T + ξijq (16)
where Δ ln cijt refers to credit growth between bank i and firm j in quarter t, K
′
i × T captures a
bank-specific time trend intended to identify the evolution of bank-specific credit supply. For our
baseline quartic trend, we define Ki = (κ1,i, κ2,i, κ3,i, κ4,i)
′ and T = (t, t2, t3, t4). Bank-specific time
trends in credit supply can be estimated as Kˆ ′i × T .
The identification of bank-specific credit supply time trends is based on the inclusion of firm-
quarter effects (μjt) that account for time-varying demand shocks as well as time invariant bank-
specific effects (ζi) that account for constant heterogeneity in supply factors at the bank level. Note
that we use now quarterly data to get a better identification of the time trends that are now the focus
of our analysis. Matched employer-employee techniques employed above enable to accommodate the
firm-quarter (μjt) and bank dummies (ζi). However, the bank-specific time trends also represent
a challenge from a computational perspective given the use of quarterly data, which multiplies by
a factor of four the number of annual observations.29 We therefore restrict the analysis to the 30
largest banks in the sample, which account for 88% of total credit.
Figure B.1 plots the indicators of credit supply when considering cubic and quartic time trends.
Interestingly, credit supply, in both cases indicate an increase during 2004-2007, and a dramatic
reduction starting in 2008. This pattern fully coincides with our aggregate quantification in section
6.3. These exercises illustrate that the type of trend (cubic or quartic) does not alter the aggregate
pattern of credit supply over time.
29This is because each bank-specific time trend must be stored as an additional set of variables to be included in the
regression. For instance, in the case of a quartic trend, quarterly loan-level data up to 2013 includes approximately
70 million bank-firm-quarter observations. The inclusion of a quartic trend for each bank in the sample implies
that 180 × 4 = 720 variables must be included in the regression in addition to the firm-quarter and bank dummies
handled by the FEiLSDVj approach. This estimation requires around 350 GB of memory which makes the problem
computationally intractable.
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Notes. This figure plots the aggregate credit supply indicator that result from averaging the bank-specific trends given
by Kˆ ′i × T . Quartic and cubic trend are plotted. The value in the first quarter is normalized to 0.
C Annual Estimates of the Bank Lending Channel
The left panel in Figure C.2 plots year-by-year estimates of the bank lending channel at the loan level.
Despite including only multibank firms, our sample consists, on average of 1,632,249 loans in each
year. Therefore, the coefficients are very precisely estimated (note that standard errors are multi-
clustered at the bank and firm level—see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)). The magnitude of
the bank lending channel is sizable: an increase of one standard deviation in bank supply generates
an average increase of 5.2 percentage points in the growth of each bank-firm credit (Δ ln cij). The
highest average bank-firm credit growth is 6.25% in 2007. Moreover, Figure C.2 also points to an
increase in the relevance of the bank lending channel during the crisis.
The right panel in Figure C.2 plots time-varying estimates of the bank lending channel at the
firm level. In this case, our sample comprises, on average, 870,734 firms per year. The magnitude
of the bank lending channel is still sizable at the firm level: an increase of one standard deviation
in bank supply generates an average increase of 2.6 percentage points in credit growth at the firm
level (Δ ln cj). The highest firm-level credit growth in our data is 5.9% in 2006 underscoring that
the bank lending channel still operates at the firm level.
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Notes. The left panel plots the β estimates from year-by-year regressions using equation (3). Standard errors used to
construct the confidence bands are multi-clustered at the bank and firm level. The right panel plots the βF estimates
from year-by-year regressions given by equation (5), which identify the bank lending channel at the firm level.
D Annual Estimates of Real Effects
Figure D.3 plots the estimated direct and indirect effects of credit supply shocks on firm growth in
terms of employment (upper panel), output (middle panel), and investment (bottom panel). We find
a positive and statistically significant direct effect of credit supply shocks on employment growth
at the firm level for all years in our sample. However, note that the statistical significance is only
marginal during the years 2004-2007. An increase of one standard deviation in bank supply generates
an average increase of 0.3 percentage points in annual employment growth at the firm level while
annual employment growth in our sample is, on average, 2.9%. These estimates confirm the larger
real effects of the credit channel during the 2008-2009 credit collapse. Downstream effects are only
positive and significant during 2008-2009 as reported in the main text while upstream effects are
statistically indistinguishable from zero in all years. The magnitude of these propagation effects is
larger than that of the direct effects.
The effects of firm-level credit supply shocks on output growth are positive and statistically
significant on output growth for most years in the sample. A one standard deviation increase in the
credit supply shock generates an average increase of 0.2 pp. in firm output growth, which accounts for
20% of the average output growth of 1.0% observed in the sample. Regarding propagation, there is
a positive and significant downstream effect during 2007-2009. The effects are not significant before
and after that period. In contrast to employment, there is a positive upstream effect during the
global financial crisis.
The direct effects are larger and always significant in the case of investment, as reported in the
main text. In line with the findings for employment and output, the magnitude of the indirect effects
is also larger than that of the direct effects, but insignificant in the case of upstream propagation.
The estimated downstream effects are larger and more precisely estimated around the global financial
crisis in 2008-2009.
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Notes. This figure plots the estimated direct and indirect effects of credit supply shocks from year-by-year regressions.
Specifically the figure plots the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the credit supply shock on annual
employment and output growth as well as investment in percentage points. The estimation samples includes, on
average, 347,913, 340,396 and 339,776 firms in each year. Standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are
multi-clustered at the main bank and industry level.
E Robustness Checks
The following tables summarize the estimated effects of a series of robustness to the main analysis
considering different samples for identification of the shocks and for estimation of the real effect as
well as additional controls. The tables report estimates for the entire period (2003-2013) and the
financial crisis (2008-2009).
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Table E.3: Robustness II — Sample of firms working with at least 5 banks per year
Employment Output Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009
mean annual growth (%) 0.312 -2.764 0.508 -1.755 7.572 5.111
Credit Shock coefficient (θ) 0.143 0.513*** 0.124*** 0.175*** 0.649*** 0.587***
|θ/mean annual growth (%)| 0.46 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.11
DOWN coefficient (θD) 0.286*** 0.770*** 0.197*** 0.709*** 0.132 1.399***
|θD/ mean annual growth (%)| 0.92 0.28 0.39 0.40 0.02 0.27
UP coefficient (θU ) 0.059 -0.191 0.097 0.514*** 0.131 0.107
|θU/mean annual growth (%)| 0.19 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.02 0.02
Notes. Analogous to Table 8 in the main text, this table summarizes the estimated effects when restricting
the sample to those firms with at least five banks per year. We focus on the estimates for the entire period
(2003-2013) and the financial crisis (2008-2009). Mean annual growth (%) refers to the average annual growth
rate of the variable as measured in our sample of firms in a particular period. Credit Shock coefficient (θ),
DOWN coefficient (θD), and UP coefficient (θU ) are the estimated coefficients reported in tables 6, 7 and 5.
We denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% with ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively. |θ/mean annual growth (%)| is the
absolute value of the estimated coefficient divided by the mean annual growth (%).
Table E.2: Robustness I — Different subsamples for shock identification and real effects estimation
Employment Output Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009
mean annual growth (%) 0.312 -2.764 0.508 -1.755 7.572 5.111
Credit Shock coefficient (θ) 0.277** 0.594*** 0.115*** 0.175*** 0.784*** 0.617***
|θ/mean annual growth (%)| 0.89 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.10 0.12
DOWN coefficient (θD) 0.316** 0.663** 0.344*** 0.622*** 0.662*** 1.230***
|θD/ mean annual growth (%)| 1.01 0.24 0.68 0.35 0.09 0.24
UP coefficient (θU ) 0.065 -0.186 0.200** 0.458*** 0.147 0.084
|θU/mean annual growth (%)| 0.21 0.07 0.39 0.26 0.02 0.02
Notes. Analogous to Table 8 in the main text, this table summarizes the estimated effects when considering
different samples for identification of the shocks and for estimation of the real effects. We focus on the estimates
for the entire period (2003-2013) and the financial crisis (2008-2009). Mean annual growth (%) refers to the
average annual growth rate of the variable as measured in the sample of firms in a particular period. Credit
Shock coefficient (θ), DOWN coefficient (θD), and UP coefficient (θU ) are the estimated coefficients reported in
tables 6, 7 and 5. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. |θ/mean annual
growth (%)| is the absolute value of the estimated coefficient divided by the mean annual growth (%).
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Table E.4: Robustness III — Shock identification including bank-firm controls in the regression.
Employment Output Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009 2003-2013 2008-2009
mean annual growth (%) 0.312 -2.764 0.508 -1.755 7.572 5.111
Credit Shock coefficient (θ) 0.299*** 0.568*** 0.106*** 0.167*** 0.786*** 0.632***
|θ/mean annual growth (%)| 0.96 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.10 0.12
DOWN coefficient (θD) 0.276** 0.674** 0.408*** 0.627*** 0.875*** 1.239***
|θD/ mean annual growth (%)| 0.88 0.24 0.80 0.36 0.12 0.24
UP coefficient (θU ) 0.055 -0.178 0.229*** 0.447*** 0.219 0.094
|θU/mean annual growth (%)| 0.18 0.06 0.45 0.25 0.03 0.02
Notes. Analogous to Table 8 in the main text, this table summarizes the estimated effects when including bank-
firm controls in the shock identification regression. We focus on the estimates for the entire period (2003-2013)
and the financial crisis (2008-2009). Mean annual growth (%) refers to the average annual growth rate of the
variable as measured in the sample of firms in a particular period. Credit Shock coefficient (θ), DOWN coefficient
(θD), and UP coefficient (θU ) are the estimated coefficients reported in tables 6, 7 and 5. We denote significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. |θ/mean annual growth (%)| is the absolute value of the
estimated coefficient divided by the mean annual growth (%).
F Results by Firm-Size
The richness of our sample and identified shocks enables us to run our specification from equation
(10) for three size bins: 0-10, 10-500, ≥ 500. Table F.5 reports the regression outcomes. Our main
result from these regressions is that the largest firms do not seem to be affected either directly or
indirectly by the estimated credit supply shocks. In particular, we run the regression for firms with
more than 500 employees, the coefficients associated to credit supply shocks and downstream and
upstream propagation of these shocks are not statistically significant. This is the case for both
employment growth, output growth, and investment when the direct shock is considered. Turning
to downstream propagation (shock from suppliers), the effect is only significant in the case of output
growth for large firms while it is not significant in the case of employment growth and investment.
Note, however, that the sample for larger firms is substantially smaller.
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Table F.5: Real directs and indirect effects of credit shocks by firm size 2008-2009
employment output investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0-10 10-500 +500 0-10 10-500 +500 0-10 10-500 +500
Credit Shock 0.447*** 0.638* 1.063 0.065*** 0.305*** 0.268 0.460*** 0.438*** 3.106
(s.e) (0.133) (0.319) (0.894) (0.013) (0.049) (1.247) (0.098) (0.148) (2.807)
DOWN 1.016*** 0.480 -1.028 0.515*** 2.183*** 4.407 1.497*** 0.925** 0.061
(s.e) (0.336) (0.663) (1.309) (0.170) (0.343) (1.598) (0.266) (0.407) (1.917)
UP 0.312 -0.219 1.455 0.328** 0.246 1.834 0.242 0.134 -0.212
(s.e) (0.392) (0.609) (0.838) (0.153) (0.224) (1.218) (0.348) (0.402) (1.215)
# obs 289,327 98,522 1,036 279,098 97,389 1,015 280,285 97,939 1,050
R2 0.042 0.051 0.058 0.116 0.096 0.10 0.012 0.015 0.013
Sample firms All All All All All All All All All
Fixed effects sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year sector × year
Notes. This table reports the direct and indirect effects of credit supply on employment, output, and investment over the 2008-2009
period, estimated using equation (10), for firms of different size. Columns (1), (4), and (7) refer to firms with between 0 and 10 employees.
Columns (2), (5), and (8) refer to firms with between 10 and 500 employees, and columns (3), (6), and (9) to firms with more than 500
employees. Credit Shock refers to the firm-specific credit supply shock estimated in equation (6), normalized to have zero mean and unit
variance. DOWNjt,s measures the indirect shock received by firm j operating in sector s from its suppliers (downstream propagation).
UPjt,s proxies for the indirect shock received by firm j operating in sector s from its customers (upstream propagation). All regressions
include the following control variables: firm-specific credit demand shocks (λˆjt), lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported
in parentheses.
G A Description of Bigio and La’o (2016)
Technology and market structur: There are n industries in the economy. In each of these












where yi is the amount of units produced in industry i, xij is the amount of goods produced in industry
j used as inputs by industry i, li is the amount of labor used by industry i, ηi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i governs the
fraction of revenue devoted to cover input expenditures, i.e., labor plus intermediate goods, αi ∈ (0, 1)
∀i determines the share of labor in total input expenditures. Finally, wij determines the share of
intermediate good j in total expenditure in intermediate goods of industry i, with
∑n
j=1wij = 1.
Financial constraints We assume the existence of working capital, which implies that firms must
pay wages and the cost of intermediate goods before production takes place. Firms must borrow for
this purpose. Financial markets are subject to some imperfection and thus firms can borrow up to




pjXij ≤ χipiyi (18)
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Preferences Assume that the economy is populated by a representative household whose prefer-











j with vj ∈ (0, 1) and
∑n
j=1 vj = 1 is the composite consumption good and l the
amount of labor supplied by the household, γ ≥ 0 captures the wealth effect on labor supply, whereas
 > 0 captures the inverse of the substitution effect, i.e., the Frisch elasticity.
























This problem can be solved in two stages. In the first stage, for a given level of firm’s expenditure
Ei, the firms decides how to allocate this expenditure across the different production factors. The
solution of this problem is given by:
li = αEi (20)
pjxij = (1− αi)wijEi (21)
In the second stage, the firm decides the level of expenditure Ei, which must satisfy:
Ei = φiηiRi where φi = min{χi
ηi
, 1} (22)
Note that under decreasing returns to scale, the firm would always like to borrow an amount equal
to ηipiyi = ηiRi. When ηi ≤ χi, the firm will be able to borrow optimally. However, when ηi > χi,
the firm will borrow less than optimally.
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where wl measures the household’s labor income and
∑n
i πi the income coming firms’ profits. This
problem can also be solved in two stages. In the first stage, given a total amount of consumption of
the composite good, the household minimizes its associated expenditure across the different goods
i. This stage implies an ideal price index for the composite good. Given this price index and the
wage, the household decides how much to spend on total consumption and how much to work. The

















is the ideal price index. Equation (23) implies that the household’s con-
sumption expenditure share on a particular good j is constant and given by the share parameter
j. Equation (24) implies that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure must be
equal to the ratio of prices.
Equilibrium An equilibrium in this economy is defined as a set of prices {p1, ..., pn} and allocations
{l1, ...; ln}, {c1, ..., cn} and {xi1, ..., xin}, ∀i, such that:
1. Firms solve their maximization problem, i.e., equations (20), (21), and (22) are satisfied.
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Aggregate effects of financial frictions





where z¯(z)Φ(φ) depends on sectoral productivities and financial frictions, L is the endogenous amount
of labor in the economy, and η¯ is a constant that reflects the decreasing returns in firms’ technology.
Bigio and La’o (2016) refer to the term z¯(z)Φ(φ) as the efficiency wedge and to the term Lη¯ as the
labor wedge.
Calibration: details For our baseline results, we set η = 0.99 for all sectors i. We report results
using a different value for η in the appendix. We further set to some predetermined values the
parameters governing the household labor supply. In particular, following Bigio and La’o (2016), we
set γ = 0 and  = 2.
We identify the 2003 level of financial frictions for each sector i (φi) by exploiting the fact that





= φiη ∀i (28)
Given our assumed value of η and data on sectoral gross output, labor and intermediate goods
expenses measured from the input-output tables, we can obtain a value of φ for each industry. We
identify the labor share in each sector i (αi) in the production function by exploiting the fact that







Finally, we identify the industry shares in the Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator by matching





provided by the IO tables. The parameters governing the IO structure of the economy use the
information provided by the Spanish direct requirement matrix. In particular, with the information
provided in this matrix we can measure, in each industry i, the expenditure on each intermediate
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